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Abstract
Providing explanations for deep neural network (DNN)
models is crucial for their use in security-sensitive domains.
A plethora of interpretation models have been proposed to
help users understand the inner workings of DNNs: how does
a DNN arrive at a specific decision for a given input? The
improved interpretability is believed to offer a sense of se-
curity by involving human in the decision-making process.
Yet, due to its data-driven nature, the interpretability itself
is potentially susceptible to malicious manipulations, about
which little is known thus far.
Here we bridge this gap by conducting the first systematic
study on the security of interpretable deep learning systems
(IDLSes). We show that existing IDLSes are highly vulner-
able to adversarial manipulations. Specifically, we present
ADV2, a new class of attacks that generate adversarial inputs
not only misleading target DNNs but also deceiving their
coupled interpretation models. Through empirical evaluation
against four major types of IDLSes on benchmark datasets
and in security-critical applications (e.g., skin cancer diag-
nosis), we demonstrate that with ADV2 the adversary is able
to arbitrarily designate an input’s prediction and interpreta-
tion. Further, with both analytical and empirical evidence, we
identify the prediction-interpretation gap as one root cause
of this vulnerability – a DNN and its interpretation model
are often misaligned, resulting in the possibility of exploiting
both models simultaneously. Finally, we explore potential
countermeasures against ADV2, including leveraging its low
transferability and incorporating it in an adversarial training
framework. Our findings shed light on designing and operat-
ing IDLSes in a more secure and informative fashion, leading
to several promising research directions.
1 Introduction
The recent advances in deep learning have led to break-
throughs in many long-standing machine learning tasks (e.g.,
image classification [22], natural language processing [54],
and even playing Go [49]), enabling use cases previously
considered strictly experimental.
However, the state-of-the-art performance of deep neural
network (DNN) models is often achieved at the cost of in-
terpretability. It is challenging to intuitively understand the
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Figure 1: Sample (a) benign, (b) regular adversarial, and (c) dual
adversarial inputs and interpretations on ResNet [22] (classifier) and
CAM [64] (interpreter).
inference of complicated DNNs – how does a DNN arrive
at a specific decision for a given input – due to their high
non-linearity and nested architectures. This is a major draw-
back for applications in which the interpretability of decisions
is a critical prerequisite, while simple black-box predictions
cannot be trusted by default. Another drawback of DNNs
is their inherent vulnerability to adversarial inputs – mali-
ciously crafted samples to trigger target DNNs to malfunc-
tion [9,28,56] – which leads to unpredictable model behaviors
and hinders their use in security-sensitive domains.
The drawbacks have spurred intensive research on improv-
ing the DNN interpretability via providing explanations at
either model-level [26,45,63] or instance-level [10,16,43,50].
For example, in Figure 1 (a), an attribution map highlights an
input’s most informative part with respect to its classification,
revealing their causal relationship. Such interpretability helps
users understand the inner workings of DNNs, enabling use
cases including model debugging [39], digesting security anal-
ysis results [20], and detecting adversarial inputs [13]. For
instance, in Figure 1 (b), an adversarial input, which causes
the target DNN to deviate from its normal behavior, gener-
ates an attribution map highly distinguishable from its benign
counterpart, and is thus easily detectable.
As illustrated in Figure 2, a DNN model (classifier), cou-
pled with an interpretation model (interpreter), forms an in-
terpretable deep learning system (IDLS). The enhanced inter-
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Figure 2: Workflow of an interpretable deep learning system (IDLS).
pretability of IDLSes is believed to offer a sense of security by
involving human in the decision process [57]. However, given
its data-driven nature, this interpretability itself is potentially
susceptible to malicious manipulations. Unfortunately, thus
far, little is known about the security vulnerability of IDLSes,
not to mention mitigating such threats.
Our Work. To bridge the gap, in this paper, we conduct a
comprehensive study on the security vulnerability of IDLSes,
which leads to the following interesting findings.
First, we demonstrate that existing IDLSes are highly vul-
nerable to adversarial manipulations. We present ADV2, a
new class of attacks that generate adversarial inputs not only
misleading a target DNN but also deceiving its coupled in-
terpreter. By empirically evaluating ADV2 against four ma-
jor types of IDLSes on benchmark datasets and in security-
critical applications (e.g., skin cancer diagnosis), we show
that it is practical to generate adversarial inputs with predic-
tions and interpretations arbitrarily chosen by the adversary.
For example, Figure 1 (c) shows adversarial inputs that are
misclassified by target DNNs and also interpreted highly sim-
ilarly to their benign counterparts. Thus the interpretability of
IDLSes merely provides limited security assurance.
Then, we show that one possible root cause of this attack
vulnerability lies in the prediction-interpretation gap: the in-
terpreter is often misaligned with the classifier, while the
interpreter’s interpretation only partially explains the classi-
fier’s behavior, allowing the adversary to exploit both models
simultaneously. This finding entails several intriguing ques-
tions: (i) what, in turn, is the possible cause of this gap? (ii)
how does this gap vary across different interpreters? (iii) what
is its implication for designing more robust interpreters? We
explore all these key questions in our study.
Further, we investigate the transferability of ADV2 across
different interpreters. We note that it is often difficult to find
adversarial inputs transferable across distinct types of inter-
preters, as they generate interpretations from complementary
perspectives (e.g., back-propagation, intermediate representa-
tions, input-prediction correspondence). This finding points
to training an ensemble of interpreters as one potential coun-
termeasure against ADV2.
Finally, we present adversarial interpretation distillation
(AID), an adversarial training framework which integrates
ADV2 in training interpreters. We show that AID effectively
Notation Definition
f , g target classifier, interpreter
x◦, x∗ benign, adversarial input
ct , mt adversary’s target class, interpretation
x[i] i-th dimension of x
ε perturbation magnitude bound
‖ · ‖ vector norm
`int, `prd, `adv interpretation, prediction, overall loss
α learning rate
Table 1. Symbols and notations.
reduces the prediction-interpretation gap and potentially helps
improve the robustness of interpreters against ADV2.
To our best knowledge, this work represents the first sys-
tematic study on the security vulnerability of existing IDLSes.
We believe our findings shed light on designing and operating
IDLSes in a more secure and informative manner.
Roadmap. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
§ 2 introduces fundamental concepts; § 3 presents the ADV2
attack and details its implementation against four major types
of interpreters; § 4 empirically evaluates its effectiveness; § 5
explores the fundamental causes of the attack vulnerability
and discusses possible countermeasures; § 6 surveys relevant
literature; the paper is concluded in § 7.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with introducing a set of fundamental concepts
and assumptions. The symbols and notations used in this
paper are summarized in Table 1.
Classifier – In this paper, we primarily focus on predictive
tasks (e.g., image classification [12]), in which a DNN f (i.e.,
classifier) assigns a given input x to one of a set of predefined
classes C , f (x) = c ∈ C .
Interpreter – In general, the DNN interpretability can
be obtained in two ways: designing interpretable DNNs
[45, 62] or extracting post-hoc interpretations. The latter
case does not require modifying model architectures or pa-
rameters, thereby leading to higher prediction accuracy. We
thus mainly consider post-hoc interpretations in this paper.
More specifically, we focus on instance-level interpretabil-
ity [10,16,26,37,38,45,48,50,63], which explains how a DNN
f classifies a given input x and uncovers the causal relation-
ship between x and f (x). We assume such interpretations are
given in the form of attribution maps. As shown in Figure 2,
the interpreter g generates an attribution map m = g(x; f ),
with its i-th element m[i] quantifying the importance of x’s
i-th feature x[i] with respect to f (x).
Adversarial Attack – DNNs are inherently vulnerable to
adversarial inputs, which are maliciously crafted samples to
force DNNs to misbehave [36, 56]. Typically, an adversarial
input x∗ is generated by modifying a benign input x◦ via pixel
perturbation (e.g., PGD [35]) or spatial transformation (e.g.,
STADV [60]), with the objective of forcing f to misclassify
x∗ to a target class ct , f (x∗) = ct 6= f (x◦). To ensure the at-
tack evasiveness, the modification is often constrained to an
allowed set (e.g., a norm ball Bε(x◦) = {x|‖x− x◦‖∞ ≤ ε}).
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Consider PGD, a universal first-order adversarial attack, as a
concrete case. At a high level, PGD implements a sequence
of project gradient descent on the loss function:
x(i+1) =ΠBε(x◦)
(
x(i)−αsgn(∇x`prd ( f (x(i)) ,ct))) (1)
where Π is the projection operator, α represents the learn-
ing rate, the loss function `prd measures the difference of
the model prediction f (x) and the class ct targeted by the
adversary (e.g., cross entropy), and x(0) is initialized as x◦.
Threat Model – Following the line of work on adversarial
attacks [9,19,35,56], we assume in this paper a white-box set-
ting: the adversary has complete access to the classifier f and
the interpreter g, including their architectures and parameters.
This is a conservative and realistic assumption. Prior work has
shown that it is possible to train a surrogate model f ′ given
black-box access to a target DNN f [41]; given that the inter-
preter is often derived directly from the classifier (details in
§ 3), the adversary may then train a substitution interpreter g′
based on f ′. We consider investigating such black-box attacks
as our ongoing work.
3 ADV2 Attack
The interpretability of IDLSes is believed to offer a sense
of security by involving human in the decision process [13,
17, 20, 57]; this belief has yet to be rigorously tested. We
bridge this gap by presenting ADV2, a new class of attacks
that deceive target DNNs and their interpreters simultaneously.
Below we first give an overview of ADV2 and then detail its
instantiations against four major types of interpreters.
3.1 Attack Formulation
The ADV2 attack deceives both the DNN f and its coupled
interpreter g. Specifically, ADV2 generates an adversarial in-
put x∗ by modifying a benign input x◦ such that
• (i) x∗ is misclassified by f to a target class ct , f (x∗) = ct ;
• (ii) x∗ triggers g to generate a target attribution map mt ,
g(x∗; f ) = mt ;
• (iii) The difference between x∗ and x◦, ∆(x∗,x◦), is im-
perceptible;
where the distance function ∆ depends on the concrete mod-
ification: for pixel perturbation (e.g., [35]), it is instantiated
as Lp norm, while for spatial transformation (e.g., [60]), it is
defined as the overall spatial distortion.
In other words, the goal is to find sufficiently small per-
turbation to the benign input that leads to the prediction and
interpretation desired by the adversary.
At a high level, we formulate ADV2 using the following
optimization framework:
min
x
∆(x,x◦) s.t.
{
f (x) = ct
g(x; f ) = mt
(2)
where the constraints ensure that (i) the adversarial input is
misclassified as ct and (ii) it triggers g to generate the target
attribution map mt .
As the constraints of f (x) = ct and g(x; f ) = mt are highly
non-linear for practical DNNs, we reformulate Eqn (2) in a
form more suited for optimization:
min
x
`prd( f (x),ct)+λ`int (g(x; f ),mt)
s.t. ∆(x,x◦)≤ ε (3)
where the prediction loss `prd is the same as in Eqn (1), the
interpretation loss `int measures the difference of adversarial
map g(x; f ) and target map mt , and the hyper-parameter λ
balances the two factors. Below we use `adv(x) to denote the
overall loss function defined in Eqn (3).
We construct the solver of Eqn (3) upon an adversarial at-
tack framework. While it is flexible to choose the concrete
framework, below we primarily use PGD [35] as the refer-
ence and discuss the construction of ADV2 upon alternative
frameworks (e.g., spatial transformation [60]) in § 4.
Under this setting, we define `prd( f (x),ct) =− log( fct (x))
(i.e., the negative log likelihood of x with respect to the class
ct), ∆(x,x◦) = ‖x− x◦‖∞, and `int(g(x; f ),mt) = ‖g(x; f )−
mt‖22. In general, ADV2 searches for x∗ using a sequence of
gradient descent updates:
x(i+1) =ΠBε(x◦)
(
x(i)−αsgn(∇x`adv (x(i)))) (4)
However, directly applying Eqn (4) is often found inef-
fective, due to the unique characteristics of individual inter-
preters. In the following, we detail the instantiations of ADV2
against the back-propagation-, representation-, model-, and
perturbation-guided interpreters, respectively.
3.2 Back-Propagation-Guided Interpretation
This class of interpreters compute the gradient (or its vari-
ants) of the model prediction with respect to a given input to
derive the importance of each input feature. The hypothesis
is that larger gradient magnitude indicates higher relevance
of the feature to the prediction. We consider gradient saliency
(GRAD) [50] as a representative of this class.
Intuitively, GRAD considers a linear approximation of the
model prediction (probability) fc(x) for a given input x and a
given class c, and derives the attribution map m as:
m =
∣∣∣∣∂ fc(x)∂x
∣∣∣∣ (5)
To attack GRAD-based IDLSes, we may search for x∗ using
a sequence of gradient descent updates as defined in Eqn (4).
However, according to Eqn (5), computing the gradient of the
attribution map g(x; f ) amounts to computing the Hessian
matrix of fc(x), which is all-zero for DNNs with ReLU acti-
vation functions. Thus the gradient of the interpretation loss
`int provides little information for updating x, which makes
directly applying Eqn (4) ineffective.
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Figure 3: Comparison of h(z), σ(z), and r(z) near z = 0.
To overcome this, when performing back-propagation, we
smooth the gradient of ReLU, denoted by r(z), with a function
h(z) defined as (τ is a small constant, e.g., 10−4):
h(z),
{
(z+
√
z2+ τ)′ = 1+ z/
√
z2+ τ (z< 0)
(
√
z2+ τ)′ = z/
√
z2+ τ (z≥ 0)
Intuitively, h(z) tightly approximates r(z), while its gradi-
ent is non-zero everywhere. Another possibility is the sig-
moid function σ(z) = 1/(1+ e−z). Figure 3 compares dif-
ferent functions near z = 0. Our evaluation shows that h(z)
significantly outperforms σ(z) and r(z) in attacking GRAD.
This attack is extensible to other back-propagation-based
interpreters (e.g., DEEPLIFT [48], SMOOTHGRAD [51], and
LRP [6]), due to their fundamentally equivalent, gradient-
centric formulations [3].
3.3 Representation-Guided Interpretation
This class of interpreters leverage the feature maps at in-
termediate layers of DNNs to generate attribution maps. We
consider class activation mapping (CAM) [64] as a represen-
tative interpreter of this class.
At a high level, CAM performs global average pooling [30]
over the feature maps of the last convolutional layer, and
uses the outputs as features for a linear layer with softmax
activation to approximate the model predictions. Based on
this connectivity structure, CAM computes the attribution
maps by projecting the weights of the linear layer back to the
convolutional feature maps.
Formally, let ak[i, j] denote the activation of the k-th chan-
nel of the last convolutional layer at the spatial position
(i, j). The output of global average pooling is defined as
Ak = ∑i, j ak[i, j]. Further let wk,c be the weight of the con-
nection between the k-th input and the c-th output of the
linear layer. The input to the softmax function for a class c
with respect to a given input x is approximated by:
zc(x)≈∑
k
wk,c Ak =∑
i, j
∑
k
wk,c ak[i, j] (6)
The class activation map mc is then given by:
mc[i, j] =∑
k
wk,c ak[i, j] (7)
Due to its use of deep representations at intermediate layers,
CAM generates attribution maps of high visual quality and
limited noise and artifacts [30].
We instantiate g with a DNN that concatenates the part of
f up to its last convolutional layer and a linear layer parame-
terized by {wk,c}. To attack CAM, we search for x∗ using a se-
quence of gradient descent updates as defined in Eqn (4). This
attack can be readily extended to other representation-guided
interpreters (e.g., GRADCAM [47]), with details deferred to
Appendix A1.
3.4 Model-Guided Interpretation
Instead of relying on deep representations at intermediate
layers, model-guided methods train a meta-model to directly
predict the attribution map for any given input in a single
feed-forward pass. We consider RTS [10] as a representative
method in this category.
For a given input x in a class c, RTS finds its attribution
map m by solving the following optimization problem:
minm λ1rtv(m)+λ2rav(m)− log( fc (φ(x;m)))
+λ3 fc (φ(x;1−m))λ4
s.t. 0≤ m≤ 1
(8)
Here rtv(m) denotes the total variation of m, which reduces
noise and artifacts in m; rav(m) represents the average value
of m, which minimizes the size of retained parts; φ(x;m) is
the operator using m as a mask to blend x with random colors
and Gaussian blur, which captures the impact of retained parts
(where the mask is non-zero) on the model prediction; the
hyper-parameters {λi}4i=1 balance these factors. Intuitively,
this formulation finds the sufficient and necessary parts of x,
based on which f is able to make the prediction f (x) with
high confidence.
However, solving Eqn (8) for every input during inference
is fairly expensive. Instead, RTS trains a DNN to directly
predict the attribution map for any given input, without ac-
cessing to the DNN f after training. In [44], this is achieved
by composing a ResNet [22] pre-trained on ImageNet [12]
as the encoder (which extracts feature maps of given inputs
at different scales) and a U-NET [44] as the masking model,
which is then trained to directly optimize Eqn (8). We con-
sider the composition of this encoder and this masking model
as the interpreter g.
To attack RTS, one may directly apply Eqn (4). However,
our evaluation shows that this strategy is often ineffective
for finding desirable adversarial inputs. This is explained by
that the encoder enc(·) plays a significant role in generating
attribution maps, while solely relying on the outputs of the
masking model is insufficient to guide the attack. We thus
add to Eqn (3) an additional loss term `enc(enc(x),enc(ct)),
which measures the difference of the encoder’s outputs for
the adversarial input x and the target class ct .
We then search for the adversarial input x∗ with a sequence
of gradient descent updates defined in Eqn (4). More imple-
mentation details are discussed in § 3.6.
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3.5 Perturbation-Guided Interpretation
The fourth class of interpreters formulate finding the attri-
bution map by perturbing the input with minimum noise and
observing the change in the model prediction. We consider
MASK [16] as a representative interpreter in this class.
For a given input x, MASK identifies its most informative
parts by checking whether changing such parts influences the
prediction f (x). It learns a mask m, where m[i] = 0 if the i-th
input feature is retained and m[i] = 1 if the feature is replaced
with Gaussian noise. The optimal mask is found by solving
an optimization problem:
min
m
fc(φ(x;m))+λ‖1−m‖1 s.t. 0≤ m≤ 1 (9)
where c denotes the current prediction c = f (x) and φ(x;m)
is the perturbation operator which blends x with Gaussian
noise. The first term finds m that causes the probability of c
to decrease significantly, while the second term encourages m
to be sparse. Intuitively, solving Eqn (9) amounts to finding
the most informative and necessary parts of x with respect to
its prediction f (x). Note that this formulation may result in
significant artifacts in m. A more refined formulation is given
in Appendix A2.
Unlike other classes of interpreters, to attack MASK, it is
infeasible to directly optimize Eqn (3) with iterative gradient
descent (Eqn (4)), because the interpreter g itself is formulated
as an optimization procedure.
Instead, we reformulate ADV2 using a bilevel optimiza-
tion framework. For given x◦, ct , mt , f , and g, we re-define
the adversarial loss function as `adv(x,m) , `prd( f (x),ct)+
λ`int(m,mt) by introducing m as an additional variable. Let
`map(m;x) be the objective function defined in Eqn (9) (or its
variant Eqn (16)). Note that m∗(x) = argminm `map(m;x) is
the attribution map found by MASK for a given input x. We
then have the following attack framework:
min
x
`adv (x, m∗(x))
s.t. m∗(x) = argmin
m
`map(m;x) (10)
Still, solving the bilevel optimization in Eqn (10) exactly
is challenging, as it requires recomputing m∗(x) by solving
the inner optimization problem whenever x is updated. We
propose an approximate iterative procedure which optimizes
x and m by alternating between gradient descent on `adv and
`map respectively.
More specifically, at the i-th iteration, given the current
input x(i−1), we compute its attribution map m(i) by updating
m(i−1) with gradient descent on `map
(
m(i−1);x(i−1)
)
; we then fix
m(i) and obtain x(i) by minimizing `adv after a single step of
gradient descent with respect to m(i). Formally, we define the
objective function for updating x(i) as:
`adv
(
x(i−1), m(i)−ξ∇m`map
(
m(i);x(i−1)
))
where ξ is the learning rate for this virtual gradient descent.
The rationale behind this procedure is as follows. While it
is difficult to directly minimizing `adv (x,m∗(x)) with respect
to x, we use a single-step unrolled map as a surrogate of m∗(x).
A similar approach is used in [15]. Essentially, this iterative
optimization defines a Stackelberg game [46] between the
optimizer for x (leader) and the optimizer for m (follower),
which requires the leader to anticipate the follower’s next
move to reach the equilibrium.
Algorithm 1: ADV2 against MASK.
Input: x◦: benign input; ct : target class; mt : target map; f : target DNN;
g: MASK interpreter
Output: x∗: adversarial input
1 initialize x and m as x◦ and g(x◦; f );
2 while not converged do
// update m
3 update m by gradient descent along ∇m`map(m;x);
// update x with single-step lookahead
4 update x by gradient descent along
∇x`adv
(
x, m−ξ∇m`map (m;x)
)
;
5 return x;
Algorithm 1 sketches the attack against MASK. More im-
plementation details are given in § 3.6. The theoretical justifi-
cation for its effectiveness is deferred to Appendix A3.
3.6 Implementation and Optimization
Next we detail the implementation of ADV2 and present
a suite of optimizations to improve the attack effectiveness
against specific interpreters.
Iterative Optimizer – We build the optimizer based upon
PGD [35], which iteratively updates the adversarial input using
Eqn (4). By default, we use L∞ norm to measure the perturba-
tion magnitude. It is possible to adopt alternative frameworks
if other perturbation metrics are considered. For instance,
instead of modifying pixels directly, one may generate adver-
sarial inputs via spatial transformation [2, 60], in which the
perturbation magnitude is often measured by the overall spa-
tial distortion. We detail and evaluate spatial transformation-
based ADV2 in § 4.
Warm Start – It is observed in our evaluation that it is of-
ten inefficient to search for adversarial inputs by running the
update steps of ADV2 (Eqn (4)) from scratch. Rather, first run-
ning a fixed number (e.g., 400) of update steps of the regular
adversarial attack and then resuming the ADV2 update steps
significantly improves the search efficiency. Intuitively, this
strategy first quickly approaches the manifold of adversarial
inputs, and then searches for inputs satisfying both prediction
and interpretation constraints.
Label Smoothing – Recall that we measure the prediction
loss `prd( f (x),ct) with cross entropy. When attacking GRAD,
ADV2 may generate intermediate inputs that cause f to make
over-confident predictions (e.g., with probability 1). The all-
zero gradient of `prd prevents the attack from finding inputs
with desirable interpretations. To solve this, we refine cross
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entropy with label smoothing [55]. We sample yct from a
uniform distribution U(1−ρ,1) and define yc = 1−yct|C |−1 for c 6=
ct and `prd( f (x),ct) =−∑c∈C yc log fc(x). During the attack,
we gradually decrease ρ from 0.05 to 0.01.
Multistep Lookahead – In implementing Algorithm 1, we
apply multiple steps of gradient descent in both updating
m (line 3) and computing the surrogate map m∗(x) (line 4),
which is observed to lead to faster convergence in our empiri-
cal evaluation. Further, to improve the optimization stability,
we use the average gradient to update m. Specifically, let
{m(i)j } be the sequence of maps obtained at the i-th iteration
by applying multistep gradient descent. We use the aggregated
interpretation loss ∑ j ‖m(i)j −mt‖22 to compute the gradient for
updating m.
Adaptive Learning Rate – To improve the convergence
of Algorithm 1, we also dynamically adjust the learning rate
for updating m and x. At each iteration, we use a running
Adam optimizer as a meta-learner [4] to estimate the optimal
learning rate for updating m (line 3). We update x in a two-
step fashion to stabilize the training: (i) first updating x in
terms of the prediction loss `prd, and (ii) updating it in terms
of the interpretation loss `int. During (ii), we use a binary
search to find the largest step size, such that x’s confidence is
still above a certain threshold κ after the perturbation.
Periodical Reset – Recall that in Algorithm 1, we update
the estimate of the attribution map by following gradient
descent on `map. As the number of update steps increases,
this estimate may deviate significantly from the true map
generated by the MASK interpreter, which negatively impacts
the attack effectiveness. To address this, periodically (e.g.,
every 50 iterations), we replace the estimated map with the
map g(x; f ) that is directly computed by MASK based on the
current adversarial input. At the same time, we reset the Adam
step parameter to correct its internal state.
4 Attack Evaluation
Next we conduct an empirical study of ADV2 on a variety of
DNNs and interpreters from both qualitative and quantitative
perspectives. Specifically, our experiments are designed to
answer the following key questions about ADV2:
Q1: Is it effective to deceive target classifiers?
Q2: Is it effective to mislead target interpreters?
Q3: Is it evasive with respect to attack detection methods?
Q4: Is it effective in real security-critical applications?
Q5: Is it flexible to adopt alternative attack frameworks?
Experimental Setting
We first introduce the setting of our empirical evaluation.
Datasets – Our evaluation primarily uses ImageNet [12],
which consists of 1.2 million images from 1,000 classes. Ev-
ery image is center-cropped to 224×224 pixels. For a given
classifier f , from the validation set of ImageNet, we randomly
sample 1,000 images that are classified correctly by f to form
our test set. All the pixels are normalized to [0,1].
Classifiers – We use two state-of-the-art DNNs as the
classifiers, ResNet-50 [22] and DenseNet-169 [24], which
respectively attain 77.15% and 77.92% top-1 accuracy on
ImageNet. Using two DNNs of distinct capacities (50 layers
versus 169 layers) and architectures (residual blocks versus
dense blocks), we factor out the influence of the characteris-
tics of individual DNNs.
Interpreters – We adopt GRAD [50], CAM [64], RTS [10],
and MASK [16] as the representatives of back-propagation-,
representation-, model-, and perturbation-guided interpreters
respectively. We adopt their open-source implementation in
our evaluation. As RTS is tightly coupled with its target DNN
(i.e., ResNet), we train a new masking model for DenseNet.
To assess the validity of the implementation, we evaluate
all the interpreters in a weakly semi-supervised localization
task [8] using the benchmark dataset and method in [10].
Table 2 summarizes the results. The performance of all the
interpreters is consistent with that reported in [10], with slight
variation due to the difference of underlying DNNs.
Interpreter GRAD CAM MASK RTS
Measure 43.1 43.8 45.2 34.2
Table 2. Performance of the interpreters in this paper in a weakly
semi-supervised localization task (with ResNet as the classifier).
Attacks – We implement all the variants of ADV2 in § 3 on
the PGD framework. In addition, we also implement ADV2 on
a spatial transformation framework (STADV) [2]. We compare
ADV2 with regular PGD [35], a universal first-order adversar-
ial attack. For both ADV2 and PGD, we assume the setting
of targeted attacks, in which the adversary attempts to force
the DNNs to misclassify the adversarial inputs into randomly
designated classes. The parameter settings of all the attacks
are summarized in Appendix B.
Q1. Attack Effectiveness (Prediction)
We first evaluate the effectiveness of ADV2 in terms of
deceiving target DNNs. The effectiveness is measured using
attack success rate, which is defined as
Attack Success Rate(ASR) =
#successful trials
# total trials
and misclassification confidence (MC), which is the probabil-
ity assigned by the DNN to the target class ct .
ResNet DenseNet
GRAD CAM MASK RTS GRAD CAM MASK RTS
P 100% (1.0) 100% (1.0)
100% 100% 98% 100% 100% 100% 96% 100%
A (0.99) (1.0) (0.99) (1.0) (0.98) (1.0) (0.98) (1.0)
Table 3. Effectiveness of PGD (P) and ADV2 (A) against different
classifiers and interpreters in terms of ASR (MC).
Table 3 summarizes the attack success rate and misclassi-
fication confidence of ADV2 and PGD against different com-
binations of classifiers and interpreters. Note that as PGD is
only applied on the classifier, its effectiveness is agnostic to
the interpreters. To make fair comparison, we fix the max-
imum number of iterations as 1,000 for both attacks. It is
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observed that ADV2 achieves high success rate (above 95%)
and misclassification confidence (above 0.98) across all the
cases, which is comparable with the regular PGD attack. We
thus have the following conclusion.
Observation 1
Despite its dual objectives, ADV2 is as effective as
regular adversarial attacks in deceiving target DNNs.
Q2. Attack Effectiveness (Interpretation)
Next we evaluate the effectiveness of ADV2 in terms of gen-
erating similar interpretations to benign inputs. Specifically,
we compare the interpretations of benign and adversarial in-
puts, which is crucial for understanding the security implica-
tions of using interpretability as a means of defenses [13, 57].
Due to the lack of standard metrics for interpretation plausi-
bility, we use a variety of measures in our evaluation.
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Figure 4: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (PGD, ADV2)
inputs with respect to GRAD, CAM, MASK, and RTS on ResNet.
Visualization – We first qualitatively compare the interpre-
tations of benign and adversarial (PGD, ADV2) inputs. Fig-
ure 4 show a set of sample inputs and their attribution maps
with respect to GRAD, CAM, MASK, and RTS (more samples
in Appendix C1). Observe that in all the cases, the ADV2
inputs generate interpretations perceptually indistinguishable
from their benign counterparts. In comparison, the PGD inputs
are easily identifiable by inspecting their attribution maps.
Lp Measure – Besides qualitatively comparing the attribu-
tion maps of benign and adversarial inputs, we also measure
their similarity quantitatively. By considering attribution maps
as matrices, we measure the L1 distance between benign and
adversarial maps. Figure 5 summarizes the results (other Lp
measures in Appendix C1). For comparison, we normalize
all the measures to [0,1] by dividing them by the number of
pixels.
We have the following observations. (i) Compared with
PGD, ADV2 generates attribution maps much more similar
to benign cases. The average L1 measure of ADV2 is more
than 60% lower than PGD across all the interpreters. (ii) The
effectiveness of ADV2 varies with the target interpreter. For
instance, compared with other interpreters, the difference be-
tween PGD and ADV2 is relatively marginal on GRAD, imply-
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Figure 5: Average L1 distance between benign and adversarial (PGD,
ADV2) attribution maps.
ing that different interpreters may inherently feature varying
robustness against ADV2. (iii) The effectiveness of ADV2
seems insensitive to the underlying DNN. On both ResNet
and DenseNet, it achieves similar L1 measures.
IoU Test – Another quantitative measure for the similar-
ity of attribution maps is the intersection-over-union (IoU)
score. It is widely used in object detection [21] to compare
model predictions with ground-truth bounding boxes. For-
mally, the IoU score of a binary-valued map m with respect
to a baseline map m◦ is defined as their Jaccard similarity:
IoU(m) = |O(m)∩O(m◦)|/|O(m)∪O(m◦)|, where O(m) de-
notes the set of non-zero dimensions in m. In our case, as the
values of attribution maps are floating numbers, we first apply
threshold binarization on the maps.
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Figure 6: IoU scores of adversarial attribution maps (PGD, ADV2)
with respect to benign maps.
Following a typical rule used in the object detection task
[21] where a detected region of interest (RoI) is considered
positive if its IoU score is above 0.5 with respect to a ground-
truth mask, we thus consider an attribution map as plausible if
its IoU score exceeds 0.5 with respect to the benign attribution
map. Figure 6 compares the average IoU scores of adversarial
maps (PGD, ADV2) with respect to the benign cases. Observe
that ADV2 achieves IoU scores above 0.5 across all the inter-
preters, which are more than 40% higher than PGD in all the
cases. Especially on RTS, in which the attribution maps are
natively binary-valued, ADV2 achieves IoU scores above 0.9
on both ResNet and DenseNet.
Based on both qualitative and quantitative measures, we
have the following conclusion.
Observation 2
ADV2 is able to generate adversarial inputs with inter-
pretations highly similar to benign cases.
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Q3. Attack Evasiveness
Intuitively, from the adversary’s perspective, ADV2 entails
a search space for adversarial inputs no larger than its underly-
ing adversarial attack (e.g., PGD), as ADV2 needs to optimize
both the prediction loss `prd and interpretation loss `int, while
ADV2 only needs to optimize `prd. Next we compare PGD and
ADV2 in terms of their evasiveness with respect to adversarial
attack detection methods.
Basic ADV2 – To be succinct, we consider feature squeez-
ing (FS) [61] as a concrete detection method. FS reduces the
adversary’s search space by coalescing inputs corresponding
to different feature vectors into a single input, and detects
adversarial inputs by comparing their predictions under origi-
nal and squeezed settings. This operation is implemented in
the form of a set of “squeezers”: bit depth reduction, local
smoothing, and non-local smoothing.
Squeezer Setting PGD MASK-A RTS-A MASK-A∗ RTS-A∗
Bit Depth 2-bit 92.3% 84.1% 94.0% 11.7% 29.4%
Reduction 3-bit 72.7% 89.2% 88.3% 35.9% 13.9%
L. Smoothing 3×3 97.3% 98.6% 99.0% 16.5% 3.4%
N. Smoothing 11-3-4 52.3% 74.7% 75.3% 51.7% 29.4%
Table 4. Detectability of adversarial inputs by PGD, basic ADV2 (A),
and adaptive ADV2 (A∗) using feature squeezing.
Table 4 lists the detection rate of adversarial inputs (PGD,
ADV2) using different types of squeezers on ResNet. Observe
that the squeezers seem effective to detect both ADV2 and
PGD inputs. For instance, local smoothing achieves higher
than 97% success rate in detecting both ADV2 and PGD inputs,
with difference less than 2%. We thus have:
Observation 3
The overall detectability of ADV2 and PGD with re-
spect to feature squeezing is not significantly different.
Adaptive ADV2 – We now adapt ADV2 to evade the detec-
tion of FS. Related to existing adaptive attacks against FS [23],
this optimization is interesting in its own right. Specifically,
for smoothing squeezers, we augment the loss function `adv(x)
(Eqn (3)) with the term `sqz( f (x), f (ψ(x)), which is the cross
entropy of the predictions of original and squeezed inputs (ψ
is the squeezer).
Algorithm 2: Adaptive ADV2 against Feature Squeezing.
Input: x◦: benign input; ct : target class; f : target DNN; g:
target interpreter; ψ: bit depth reduction; i: bit depth
Output: x∗: adversarial input
// augmented `adv with `sqz w.r.t. smoothing
// attack in squeezed space
1 x+← PGD on ψ(x◦) with target ct and α= 1/2i;
// attack in original space
2 search for x∗ = argminx∈Bε(x◦) `adv(x)+λ‖ f (x)− f (x+)‖1;
3 return x∗;
For bit depth reduction, we use a two-stage strategy. (i) We
first search in the squeezed space for an adversarial input x+
that is close to x◦’s ε-neighborhood. To do so, we run PGD
over ψ(x◦) with learning rate α= 1/2i (i is the bit depth). (ii)
We then search in x◦’s ε-neighborhood for an adversarial input
x∗ that is classified similarly as x+. To do so, we augment the
loss function `adv(x) with a probability loss term ‖ f (x)−
f (x+)‖1 ( f (x+) is x+’s probability vector), and then apply
PGD to search for x∗ within x◦’s ε-neighborhood. The overall
algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 2.
Metric MASK RTS
P A A∗ P A A∗
∆L1 0.28 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.01 0.02
IoU 0.21 0.65 0.61 0.29 0.93 0.94
Table 5. L1 measures and IoU scores of adversarial attribution maps
(PGD, basic and adaptive ADV2) with respect to benign maps.
Table 4 summarizes the detection rate of adversarial inputs
generated by adaptive ADV2, which drops significantly, com-
pared with the case of basic ADV2. Note that here we only
show the possibility of adapting ADV2 to evade a representa-
tive detection method, and consider an in-depth study on this
matter as our ongoing work. Meanwhile, we compare the L1
measures and IoU scores of the attribution maps generated by
basic and adaptive ADV2 (with respect to the benign maps).
Table 5 shows the results. Observe that the optimization in
adaptive ADV2 has little impact on its attack effectiveness
against the interpreters. We may thus conclude:
Observation 4
It is possible to adapt ADV2 to generate adversarial
inputs evasive with respect to feature squeezing.
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Figure 7: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (ADV2) inputs
in the skin cancer screening application.
Q4. Real Application
We now evaluate the effectiveness of ADV2 in real security-
critical applications. We use the skin cancer screening task
from the ISIC 2018 challenge [18] as a case study, in which
given skin lesion images are categorized into a seven-disease
taxonomy. We adopt a competition-winning model1 (with
ResNet as its backbone) as the classifier, which attains 82.27%
weighted multi-class accuracy on the holdout set (more details
in Appendix C2).
1https://github.com/ngessert/isic2018
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We apply ADV2 on this classifier and measure its effective-
ness of generating plausible interpretations. Figure 7 shows
a set of samples and their attribution maps on the four inter-
preters. Observe that ADV2 generates interpretations visually
indiscernible from their benign counterparts in all the cases.
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Figure 8: L1 measures (a) and IoU scores (b) of adversarial attribu-
tion maps (PGD, ADV2) with respect to benign maps.
This similarity is further quantitatively validated in Fig-
ure 8, which shows the L1 measures (other Lp measures in
Appendix C2) and IoU scores of the maps generated by ADV2
with respect to the benign maps. For instance, the IoU scores
of ADV2 exceed 0.62 across all the interpreters.
Q5. Alternative Attack Framework
Besides the PGD framework, ADV2 can also be flexibly
built upon alternative frameworks. Here we construct ADV2
upon STADV [60], a spatial transformation-based adversarial
attack. The implementation details are given in Appendix A4.
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Figure 9: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (STADV,
STADV-based ADV2) inputs with respect to GRAD, CAM, MASK,
and RTS on ResNet.
Figure 9 illustrates sample benign and adversarial (STADV,
ADV2) inputs and their interpretations. Compared with
STADV, ADV2 generates adversarial inputs with maps much
more similar to the benign cases, which indicates the effec-
tiveness of ADV2 constructed upon the STADV framework.
This observation is also confirmed by the L1 measures and
IoU scores of adversarial attribution maps, which are shown in
Figure 10 (more results in Appendix C3). Interestingly, com-
pared with the other interpreters, MASK seems more resilient
to STADV-based ADV2. The comparison with the results of
PGD-based ADV2 (Figure 5 and 6) implies that the (relative)
robustness of different interpreters may vary with the concrete
attacks (details in § 5).
Overall we have the following conclusion.
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Figure 10: L1 measures (a) and IoU scores (b) of adversarial attri-
bution maps (STADV, STADV-based ADV2) with respect to benign
maps on ResNet.
Observation 5
As a general class of attacks, ADV2 can be flexibly
built upon alternative adversarial attack frameworks.
5 Discussion
While it is shown in § 4 that ADV2 is effective against a
range of classifiers and interpreters, the cause of this effec-
tiveness is unclear yet. Next we conduct a study on this root
cause from both analytical and empirical perspectives. Based
on our findings, we further discuss potential countermeasures
against ADV2.
Q1. Root of Attack Vulnerability
Recall that the formulation of ADV2 in Eqn (3) defines two
seemingly conflicting objectives: (i) maximizing the predic-
tion change while (ii) minimizing the interpretation change.
We thus conjecture that the effectiveness of ADV2 may stem
from the partial independence between a classifier and its
interpreter – the interpreter’s explanations only partially de-
scribe the classifier’s predictions, making it practical to exploit
both models simultaneously.
To validate the existence of this prediction-interpretation
gap, we consider ADV2 targeting randomly generated predic-
tions and interpretations. For a given input x◦, we randomly
generate a target class ct and a target interpretation mt , and
search for an adversarial input x∗ that triggers the classifier to
misclassify it as ct and also generates an interpretation similar
to mt (i.e., f (x∗) = ct and g(x∗; f )≈mt ). Intuitively, if ADV2
is able to find such x∗, it indicates that the classifier and its
interpreter can be manipulated separately; in other words, they
are only partially aligned with each other.
Random Patch Interpretation – In the first case, for a
given input, we define its target attribution map by (i) sam-
pling a patch of random shape (either a rectangle or a circle),
random angle, and random position over the input, and (ii)
setting the elements inside the patch as ‘1’ and that outside it
as ‘0’. Typically this target map deviates significantly from
its benign counterpart, due to its randomness.
We evaluate the effectiveness of ADV2 under this set-
ting. Table 6 summarizes the attack success rate of ADV2
on ResNet. Observe that compared with Table 3, targeting
random patch interpretations has little impact on the attack ef-
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GRAD CAM MASK RTS
ADV2 100% 100% 99% 100%(0.98) (1.0) (0.95) (1.0)
Table 6. ASR (MC) of ADV2 targeting random patch interpretations.
fectiveness in terms of deceiving the classifiers, implying that
the space of adversarial inputs is sufficiently large to contain
ones with targeted interpretations.
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Figure 11: Visualization of ADV2 targeting random patch interpreta-
tions across different interpreters on ResNet.
We then evaluate the effectiveness of ADV2 in terms of
generating the target interpretations. For a given benign in-
put x◦ and a target random patch map mt , ADV2 attempts to
generate an adversarial input ct with the interpretation similar
to mt . Figure 11 visualizes a set of sample results. Note that
in all the cases the ADV2 maps appear visually similar to the
target maps, highlighting the attack effectiveness. This effec-
tiveness is further validated in Table 7. Observe that across
all the interpreters, an ADV2 map is much more similar to its
target map, compared with its benign counterpart.
GRAD CAM MASK RTS
∆bL1 0.16 0.50 0.42 0.49
∆tL1 0.10 0.04 0.15 0.07
Table 7. Comparison of ADV2 and target maps (∆t) and that of ADV2
and benign maps (∆b), measured by L1 distance.
Random Class Interpretation – In the second case, for a
given input (with ct as the target class), we instantiate its target
interpretation with the attribution map of a benign input ran-
domly sampled from another class c˜t . We particularly enforce
ct 6= c˜t ; in other words, the adversarial input is misclassified
into one class but interpreted as another one.
GRAD CAM MASK RTS
ADV2 100% 100% 100% 100%(0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (1.0)
Table 8. ASR (MC) of ADV2 with random class interpretations.
The ASR of ADV2 is summarized in Table 8. Observe that
targeting random class interpretations has little influence on
the attack effectiveness of deceiving the classifiers. Figure 12
visualizes a set of sample target and ADV2 inputs and their
interpretations (DenseNet results in Appendix C4). Note that
the target and ADV2 inputs are fairly distinct, but with highly
similar interpretations. This is quantitatively validated by their
L1 measures and IoU scores listed in Figure 13.
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Figure 12: Target and adversarial (ADV2) inputs and their attribution
maps on ResNet.
GRAD CAM MASK RTS
(a)
0
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.4
GRAD CAM MASK RTS
(b)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Io
U
 S
co
re
w.r.t. Benign
w.r.t. Target
w.r.t. Benign
w.r.t. Target
Figure 13: L1 measures (a) and IoU scores (b) of adversarial maps
with respect to benign and target cases on ResNet.
The experiments above show that it is practical to generate
adversarial inputs targeting arbitrary predictions and interpre-
tations. We can therefore conclude:
Observation 6
A DNN and its interpreter are often not fully aligned,
allowing the adversary to exploit both models simulta-
neously.
Q2. Root of Prediction-Interpretation Gap
Next we explore the fundamental causes of this prediction-
interpretation gap. We speculate one following possible expla-
nation as: existing interpretation models do not comprehen-
sively capture the dynamics of DNNs, each only describing
one aspect of their behavior.
Specifically, GRAD solely relies on the gradient informa-
tion; MASK focuses on the input-prediction correspondence
while ignoring the internal representations; CAM leverages
the deep representations at intermediate layers, but neglect-
ing the input-prediction correspondence; RTS uses the in-
ternal representations in an auxiliary encoder and the input-
interpretation correspondence in the training data, which how-
ever may deviate from the true behavior of DNNs.
Intuitively the exclusive focus on one aspect (e.g., input-
prediction correspondence) of the DNN behavior results in
loose constraints: when performing the attack, the adversary
only needs to ensure that benign and adversarial inputs cause
DNNs to behave similarly from one specific perspective. We
validate this speculation from two observations, low attack
10
transferability and disparate attack robustness.
Attack Transferability – One intriguing property of adver-
sarial inputs is their transferability: an adversarial input effec-
tive against one DNN is often found effective against another
DNN, though it is not crafted on the second one [33, 36, 40].
In this set of experiments, we investigate whether such trans-
ferability exists in attacks against interpreters; that is, whether
an adversarial input that generates a plausible interpretation
against one interpreter is also able to generate a probable
interpretation against another interpreter.
CAM
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Figure 14: Visualization of attribution maps of adversarial inputs
across different interpreters on ResNet.
Specifically, for each given interpreter g, we randomly se-
lect a set of adversarial inputs crafted against g (source) and
compute their interpretations on another interpreter g′ (target).
Figure 14 illustrates the attribution maps of a given adver-
sarial input on g and g′. Further, for each case, we compare
the adversarial map (right) against the corresponding benign
map (left). Observe that the interpretation transferability is
fairly low: an adversarial input crafted against one interpreter
g rarely generates highly plausible interpretation on another
interpreter g′.
GRAD CAM MASK RTS
GRAD 0.04 0.24 0.22 0.24
CAM 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.13
MASK 0.12 0.34 0.09 0.74
RTS 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.01
PGD 0.10 0.22 0.28 0.22
Table 9. L1 distance between attribution maps of adversarial (ADV2,
PGD) on ResNet (row/column as source/target).
We further quantitatively validate this observation. Table 9
measures the L1 distance between the adversarial and benign
attribution maps across different interpreters. For comparison,
it also shows the L1 measure for the adversarial inputs gener-
ated by PGD. Observe that the adversarial inputs crafted on
g tends to generate low-quality interpretations on a different
interpreter g′, with quality comparable to that generated by
an interpretation-agnostic attack (i.e., PGD). We can therefore
conclude:
Observation 7
The transferability of adversarial inputs across differ-
ent interpreters seems low.
Attack Robustness – It is observed in § 4 that the effec-
tiveness of ADV2 varies with the target interpreter. As shown
in Figure 6, among all the interpreters, ADV2 attains the low-
est IoU scores on GRAD, suggesting that GRAD may be more
robust against ADV2. This observation may be explained
as follows: GRAD uses the gradient magnitude of each in-
put feature to measure its relevance to the model prediction;
meanwhile, ADV2 heavily uses the gradient information to
optimize the prediction loss `prd; it is inherently difficult to
minimize `prd while keeping the gradient intact.
We validate the conjecture by analyzing the robustness
of integrated gradient (IG) [53], another back-propagation-
guided interpreter, against ADV2. Due to their fundamental
equivalence [3], the discussion here also generalizes to other
back-propagation interpreters (e.g., [48, 50, 51]).
At a high level, for the i-th feature of a given input x, IG
computes its attribution m[i] by aggregating the gradient of
f (x) along the path from a baseline input x¯ to x:
m[i] = (x[i]− x¯[i])
∫ 1
0
∂ f (tx+(1− t)x¯)
∂x[i]
dt (11)
Like other back-propagation interpretation models [3], IG
satisfies the desirable completeness axiom [48] that the attri-
butions sum up to the difference between f ’s predictions for
the given input x and the baseline x¯.
To simplify the exposition, let us assume a binary classifica-
tion setting with classes C = {+,−}. The DNN f predicts the
probability of x belonging to the positive class as f (x). Given
an input x◦ from the negative class, the adversary attempts to
craft an adversarial input x∗ to force f to misclassify x∗ as pos-
itive. We define the prediction loss as `prd(x∗) = f (x∗)− f (x◦)
(i.e., the increase in the probability of positive prediction),
which can be computed as:
`prd(x∗) =
∫ 1
0
∇ f (tx∗+(1− t)x◦)>(x∗− x◦)dt (12)
Meanwhile, we define the interpretation loss as `int(x∗) =
‖m◦−m∗‖1, where m◦ and m∗ are the attribution maps of x◦
and x∗ respectively. While it is difficult to directly quantify
`int(x∗), we may use the attribution map of x∗ with x◦ as a
surrogate baseline:
∆m[i] = (x∗[i]− x◦[i])
∫ 1
0
∂ f (tx∗+(1− t)x◦)
∂x∗[i]
dt (13)
which quantifies the impact of the i-th input feature on the
difference of f (x◦) and f (x∗). Thus, `int(x∗) = ‖∆m‖1.
Proposition 1. With IG, the prediction loss is upper bounded
by the interpretation loss as: `prd(x∗)≤ `int(x∗).
Proof. We define u as the input difference u = (x∗− x◦) and
v as the integral vector with its i-th element v[i] defined as
v[i] =
∫ 1
0
∂ f (tx∗+(1− t)x◦)
∂x∗[i]
dt
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According to the definitions, we have `prd(x∗) = u>v and
`int(x∗) = ‖u v‖1, where  is the Hadamard product.
We have the following derivation: `prd(x∗) = ∑i u[i]v[i]≤
∑i ‖u[i] · v[i]‖ = `int(x∗). Thus the prediction loss is upper-
bounded by the interpretation loss.
In other words, in order to force x∗ to be misclassified
with high confidence, the difference of benign and adversarial
attribution maps needs to be large. As the objectives of ADV2
here is to maximize the prediction loss while minimizing
the interpretation loss. The coupling between prediction and
interpretation losses results in a fundamental conflict.
Note that however this conflict does not preclude effec-
tive adversarial attacks. First, the constraint of prediction and
interpretation losses may be loose. Let γprd and γint be the
thresholds of effective attacks. That is, for an effective attack,
`prd(x∗) ≥ γprd and `int(x∗) ≤ γint. There could be cases that
γprd γint, making ADV2 still highly effective (e.g., Figure 8).
Second, the adversary may pursue attacks that rely less on the
gradient information to circumvent this conflict.
Overall, with the evidence of low attack transferability and
disparate attack robustness, we can conclude:
Observation 8
Existing interpreters tend to focus on distinct aspects
of DNN behavior, which may result in the prediction-
interpretation gap.
Q3. Potential Countermeasures
Based on our findings, next we discuss potential counter-
measures against ADV2 attacks.
Defense 1: Ensemble Interpretation – Motivated by the
observation that different interpreters focus on distinct aspects
of DNN behavior (e.g., CAM focuses on deep representations
while MASK focuses on input-prediction correspondence),
a promising direction to defend against ADV2 is to deploy
multiple, complementary interpreters to provide a holistic
view of DNN behavior.
Yet, two major challenges remain to be addressed. First, dif-
ferent interpreters may provide disparate interpretations (e.g.,
Figure 14). It is challenging to optimally aggregate such inter-
pretations to detect ADV2. Second, the adversary may adapt
ADV2 to the ensemble interpreter (e.g. optimizing the inter-
pretation loss with respect to all the interpreters). It is crucial
to account for such adaptiveness in designing the ensemble in-
terpreter. We consider developing the ensemble defenses and
exploring the adversary’s adaptive strategies as our ongoing
research directions.
Defense 2: Adversarial Interpretation – Along the sec-
ond direction, we explore the idea of adversarial training.
Recall that ADV2 exploit the prediction-interpretation gap to
generate adversarial inputs. Here we employ ADV2 as a drive
to minimize this gap during training interpreters.
Specifically, we propose an adversarial interpretation dis-
tillation (AID) framework. Let A be the ADV2 attack. During
training an interpreter g, for a given input x◦, besides the
regular loss `map(x◦), we consider an additional loss term
`aid(x◦) = −‖g(x◦)− g(A(x◦))‖1, which is the negative L1
measure between the attribution maps of x◦ and its adversar-
ial counterpart A(x◦). We encourage g to minimize this loss
during the training (details in Appendix A5).
To assess the effectiveness of AID to reduce the prediction-
interpretation gap, we use RTS as a concrete case study. Recall
that RTS is a model-guided interpreter which directly predicts
the interpretation of a given input. We construct two variants
of RTS, a regular one and another with AID training (denoted
by RTSA). We measure the sensitivity of the two interpreters
to the underlying DNN behavior.
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Figure 15: Attribution maps generated by RTS and RTSA under
different noise levels and types (normal N, unifrom U) on ResNet.
In the first case, we inject random noise (either normal or
uniform) to the inputs and compare the attribution maps gen-
erated by the two interpreters. We consider two noise levels,
which respectively cause 3% and 30% misclassification on
the test set. Figure 15 shows a set of misclassified samples
under the two noise levels. Observe that compared with RTS,
RTSA appears much more sensitive to the DNN’s behavior
change, by generating highly contrastive maps. This sensi-
tivity is also quantitatively confirmed by the L1 measures
between clean and noisy maps on RTS and RTSA. The find-
ings also corroborate a similar phenomenon observed in [59]:
the representations generated by robust models tend to align
better with salient data characteristics.
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the DNN’s behavior change, by generating highly contrastive
maps. This sensitivity is also quantitatively confirmed by the
L1 distance between the clean and noisy attribution maps.
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the DNN’s behavior change, by generating highly contrastive
maps. This sensitivity is also quantitatively confirmed by the
L1 distance between the clean and noisy attribution maps.
R
T
S
<latexit sha1_base64="96Kp6KWXsT6/Gx6bjlx6ge0kIMI="></latexit>
Figure 16: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (ADV2) inputs
on RTS and RTSA.
In the second case, we assess the resilience of RTSA against
ADV2. In Figure ??, we compare the attribution maps of be-
nign and adversarial inputs RTS and RTSA. It is observed
that while ADV2 generates adversarial inputs with interpreta-
tions fairly similar to benign cases on RTS, it fails to do so on
RTS : the maps of adversarial inputs are fairly distinguish-
able from their benign counterparts. Moreover, RTSA behaves
almost identically to RTS on benign inputs, indicating that the
AID training has little impact on benign cases. These obser-
vations are confirmed by theL1 measures as well.
RTS RTSA
Benign 0.03
ADV2 0.01 0.10
Table 10. Comparison of AID and ADV2 with corresponded benign
maps, measured byL1 distance.
Overall we have the following conclusion.
Obse vation 8
It is possible to exploit ADV2 to reduce the prediction-
interpretation gap in training interpreters.
6 Related Work
In this section, we survey three categories of work rele-
vant to this work, namely, adversarial attacks and defenses,
transferability, and interpretability.
Attacks and Defenses – Due to their widespread use
in security-critical domains, machine learning models are
increasingly becoming the targets of malicious attacks [?].
Two primary threat models are considered in literature. Poi-
soning attacks – the adversary pollutes the training data to
eventually compromise the target models [?, ?, ?]; Evasion
attacks – the adversary manipulates the input data during in-
ference to trigger target models to misbehave [?, ?, ?].
Compared with simple models (e.g., support vector ma-
chines), securing deep neural networks (DNNs) in adversar-
ial settings entails more challenges due to their significantly
higher model complexity [?]. One line of work focuses on
developing new evasion attacks against DNNs [?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
Another line of work attempts to improve DNN resilience
against such attacks by inventing new training and inference
strategies [?, ?, ?, ?]. Yet, such defenses are often circum-
vented by more powerful attacks [?] or adaptively engineered
adversarial inputs [?, ?], resulting in a constant arms race be-
tween attackers and defenders [?].
This work is among the first to explore attacks against
DNNs with interpretability as a means of defense.
Transferability – One intriguing property of adversarial
attacks is their transferability [?]: adversarial inputs crafted
against one DNN is often effective against another one. This
property enables black-box attacks: the adversary generates
adversarial inputs based on a surrogate DNN and apply them
on the target model [?, ?, ?]. To defend against such attacks,
the method of ensemble adversarial training [?] has been pro-
posed, which trains DNNs using data augmented with adver-
sarial inputs crafted on other models.
This work complements this line of work by investigat-
ing the transferability of adversarial inputs across different
interpretation models.
Interpretability – A plethora of interpretation models
have been proposed to provide interpretability for black-box
DNNs, using techniques based on back-propagation [?, ?, ?],
intermediate representations [?, ?, ?], input perturbation [?],
and meta models [?].
The improved interpretability is believed to offer a sense
of security by involving human in the decision-making pro-
cess. Existing work has exploited interpretability to debug
DNNs [?], digest security analysis results [?], and detect ad-
versarial inputs [?, ?]. Intuitively, as adversarial inputs cause
unexpected DNN behaviors, the interpretation of DNN dy-
namics is expected to differ significantly between benign and
adversarial inputs.
However, recent work empirically shows that some inter-
pretation models seem insensitive to either DNNs or data gen-
eration processes [?], while transformation with no effect on
DNNs (e.g., constant shift) may significantly affect the be-
haviors of interpretation models [?].
This work shows the possibility of deceiving DNNs and
their coupled interpretation models simultaneously, imply-
ing that the improved interpretability only provides limited
security assurance, which also complements prior work by
examining the reliability of existing interpretation models
from the perspective of adversarial vulnerability.
7 Conclusion
This work represents a systematic study on the security
of interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes). We present
ADV2, a general class of attacks that generate adversarial in-
puts not only misleading target DNNs but also deceiving their
coupled interpretation models. Through extensive empirical
evaluation, we show the effectiveness of ADV2 against a range
of DNNs and interpretation models, implying that the inter-
pretability of existing IDLSes may merely offer a false sense
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Figure 16: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (ADV2) inputs
on RTS and RTSA.
In the second case, we assess the resilience of RTSA against
ADV2. In Figure 16, we compare the attribution maps of be-
nign and adversarial inputs on RTS and RTSA. It is observed
that while ADV2 generates adversarial inputs with interpreta-
tions fairly similar to benign c ses on RTS, it fails to do so on
RTSA: the maps of adversarial inputs are fairly distinguish-
able from their benign counterparts. Moreover, RTSA behav s
almost identically to RTS on benign inputs, indicating that the
AID training has little impact on benign cases. These obser-
vations are confirmed by theL1 measures as well.
RTS RTSA
Benign 0.03
ADV2 0.01 0.10
Table 10. Comparison of AID and ADV2 with corresponded benign
maps, measured byL1 distance.
Overall we have the following conclusion.
Observation 8
It is possible to exploit ADV2 to reduce the prediction-
interpretation gap in training interpreters.
6 Related Work
In this section, we survey three categories of work rele-
vant to this work, namely, adversarial attacks and defenses,
transferability, and interpretability.
Attacks and Defenses – Due to their widespread use
in security-critical domains, machine learning models are
increasingly becoming the targets of malicious attacks [9].
Two primary threat models are considered in literature. Poi-
soning attacks – the adversary pollutes the training data to
eventually compromise the target models [8, 76, 46]; Evasion
attacks – the adversary manipulates the input data during in-
ference to trigger target models to misbehave [16, 40, 49].
Compared with simple models (e.g., support vector ma-
chines), securing deep neural networks (DNNs) in adversar-
ial settings entails more challenges due to their significantly
higher model complexity [35]. One line of work focuses on
developing new evasion attacks against DNNs [71, 24, 54,
13, 42]. Another line of work attempts to improve DNN re-
silience against such attacks by inventing new training and
inference strategies [53, 44, 77, 41]. Yet, such defenses are
often circumvented by more powerful attacks [13] or adap-
tively engineered adversarial inputs [12, 5], resulting in a
constant arms race between attackers and defenders [37].
This work is among the first to explore attacks against
DNNs with interpretability as a means of defense.
Transferability – One intriguing proper y of adversarial
attacks is their transferability [71]: adversarial inputs crafted
against one DNN is often effective against another one. This
property enables black-box attacks: the adversary generates
adversarial inputs based on a surrogate DNN and apply them
on the target model [51, 14, 39]. To defend against such at-
tacks, the method of ensemble adversarial training [73] has
been proposed, which trains DNNs using data augmented
with adversarial inputs crafted on other models.
This work complements this line of work by investigat-
ing the transferability of adversarial inputs across different
interpretation models.
Interpretability – A plethora of interpretation models
have been proposed to provide interpretability for black-box
DNNs, using techniques based on back-propagation [63, 66,
67], in ermediate representations [80, 60, 19], input pertur-
bation [21], and meta models [15].
The improved interpretability is believed to offer a sense
of security by involving human in the decision-making pro-
cess. Existing work has exploited interpretability to debug
DNNs [50], dig st security analysis results [25], and detect
adversarial inputs [38, 72]. Intuitively, as adversarial inputs
cause unexpected DNN behaviors, the interpretation of DNN
dynamics is expected to differ significantly between benign
and adversarial inputs.
However, recent work empirically shows that some inter-
pretation models seem insensitive to either DNNs or data gen-
eration processes [1], while transformation with no effect on
DNNs (e.g., constant shift) may significantly affect the be-
haviors of interpretation models [33].
This work shows the possibility of deceiving DNNs and
their coupled interpretation models simultaneously, imply-
ing that the improved interpretability only provides limited
security assurance, which also complements prior work by
examining the reliability of existing interpretation models
from the perspective of adversarial vulnerability.
7 Conclusion
This work represents a systematic study on the security
of interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes). We present
ADV2, a general class of attacks that generate adversarial in-
puts not only misleading target DNNs but also deceiving their
coupled interpretation models. Through extensive empirical
evaluation, we show the effectiveness of ADV2 against a range
of DNNs and interpretation models, implying that the inter-
pretability of existing IDLSes may merely offer a false sense
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Figure 16: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (ADV2) inputs
with respect to RTS and RTSA on ResNet.
In the second case, we assess the resilience of RTSA against
12
ADV2. In Figure 16, we compare the attribution maps of be-
nign and adversarial inputs on RTS and RTSA. It is observed
that while ADV2 generates adversarial inputs with interpre-
tations fairly similar to benign cases on RTS, it fails to do so
on RTSA: the maps of adversarial inputs are fairly distinguish-
able from their benign counterparts. Moreover, RTSA behaves
almost identically to RTS on benign inputs, indicating that the
AID training has little impact on benign cases. These findings
are confirmed by the L1 measures as well.
Overall we have the following conclusion.
Observation 9
It is possible to exploit ADV2 to reduce the prediction-
interpretation gap during training interpreters.
6 Related Work
In this section, we survey three categories of work rele-
vant to this work, namely, adversarial attacks and defenses,
transferability, and interpretability.
Attacks and Defenses – Due to their widespread use in
security-critical domains, machine learning models are in-
creasingly becoming the targets of malicious attacks. Two
primary threat models are considered in literature. Poisoning
attacks – the adversary pollutes the training data to eventually
compromise the target models [7]; Evasion attacks – the ad-
versary manipulates the input data during inference to trigger
target models to misbehave [11].
Compared with simple models (e.g., support vector ma-
chines), securing deep neural networks (DNNs) in adversar-
ial settings entails more challenges due to their significantly
higher model complexity [29]. One line of work focuses on
developing new evasion attacks against DNNs [19, 35, 56].
Another line of work attempts to improve DNN resilience
against such attacks by inventing new training and inference
strategies [34, 42, 61]. Yet, such defenses are often circum-
vented by more powerful attacks [9] or adaptively engineered
adversarial inputs [5], resulting in a constant arms race be-
tween attackers and defenders [31].
This work is among the first to explore attacks against
DNNs with interpretability as a means of defense.
Transferability – One intriguing property of adversarial
attacks is their transferability [56]: adversarial inputs crafted
against one DNN is often effective against another one. This
property enables black-box attacks – the adversary generates
adversarial inputs based on a surrogate DNN and then applies
them on the target model [33, 40]. To defend against such
attacks, the method of ensemble adversarial training [58] has
been proposed, which trains DNNs using data augmented
with adversarial inputs crafted on other models.
This work complements this line of work by investigat-
ing the transferability of adversarial inputs across different
interpretation models.
Interpretability – A plethora of interpretation models
have been proposed to provide interpretability for black-
box DNNs, using techniques based on back-propagation
[50, 52, 53], intermediate representations [14, 47, 64], input
perturbation [16], and meta models [10].
The improved interpretability is believed to offer a sense
of security by involving human in the decision-making pro-
cess. Existing work has exploited interpretability to debug
DNNs [39], digest security analysis results [20], and detect
adversarial inputs [32, 57]. Intuitively, as adversarial inputs
cause unexpected DNN behaviors, the interpretation of DNN
dynamics is expected to differ significantly between benign
and adversarial inputs.
However, recent work empirically shows that some inter-
pretation models seem insensitive to either DNNs or data
generation processes [1], while transformation with no effect
on DNNs (e.g., constant shift) may significantly affect the
behaviors of interpretation models [27].
This work shows the possibility of deceiving DNNs and
their coupled interpretation models simultaneously, imply-
ing that the improved interpretability only provides limited
security assurance, which also complements prior work by
examining the reliability of existing interpretation models
from the perspective of adversarial vulnerability.
7 Conclusion
This work represents a systematic study on the security
of interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes). We present
ADV2, a general class of attacks that generate adversarial in-
puts not only misleading target DNNs but also deceiving their
coupled interpretation models. Through extensive empirical
evaluation, we show the effectiveness of ADV2 against a range
of DNNs and interpretation models, implying that the inter-
pretability of existing IDLSes may merely offer a false sense
of security. We identify the prediction-interpretation gap as
one possible cause of this vulnerability, raising the critical
concern about the current assessment metrics of interpreta-
tion models. Further, we discuss potential countermeasures
against ADV2, which sheds light on designing and operating
IDLSes in a more robust and informative fashion.
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Appendix
A. Implementation Details
A1. ADV2 against Grad-CAM
Gradient-weighted class activation mapping (GRADCAM)
[47] is another feature-guided interpretation model. Similar
to CAM, it approximates the model predictions as a weighted
summation of the feature maps of the last convolutional layer.
Differently, it projects global averaged gradients back to the
convolutional feature maps:
wk,c =
1
Z∑i, j
∂ fc(x)
∂ak[i, j]
(14)
where fc(x) is the model prediction with respect to input x
and class c, ak[i, j] is the activation of the k-th channel of the
last convolutional layer at the spatial position (i, j), and Z is
a normalization constant. The attribution map is defined as:
mc[i, j] = ReLU
(
∑
k
wk,c ak[i, j]
)
(15)
To attack GRADCAM, we apply the same optimization
procedure in § 3.3. Note that although the gradient of wk,y(x)
with respect to x is zero almost everywhere, it is feasible to
find high-quality solutions using stochastic gradient descent
methods, since ak has non-zero gradients with respect to x.
Attack ASR ∆ (L1) ∆ (L2)
P 100.0% (1.0) 0.22 0.28
A 100.0% (0.98) 0.07 0.09
Table 10. Effectiveness of PGD and ADV2 against GRADCAM.
Table 10 summarizes the attack success rate, misclassifi-
cation confidence, L1 and L2 distance between benign and
adversarial maps (by PGD and ADV2).
A2. Optimized MASK Formulation
The complete optimization objective for MASK in [16] is
given as follows:
min
m
λ1rtv(m)+λ2‖1−m‖1+Eτ [ fc (φ(x(·− τ),m))]
s.t. 0≤ m≤ 1 (16)
Here the term rtv(m) is the total variation of m, which reduces
its noise and artifacts; the term ‖1−m‖1 encourages the spar-
sity of m; φ(x;m) is the perturbation operator which blends x
with Gaussian noise (controlled by the parameter τ); while λ1
and λ2 are the regularized coefficients for total variation and
sparsity respectively.
A3. Analysis of ADV2 against MASK
Here we provide simple analysis for the effectiveness of
ADV2 in Algorithm 1. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let f (x,y) :Rm×Rn→R be a function with
continuous second-order derivative in the neighborhoodN =
Nx×Ny of a point (x0,y0). Assume the following conditions
hold:
• C1. For each x ∈ Nx, there is a unique g(x) , y ∈ Ny
such that y is a local minimizer of f (x, ·);
• C2. y0 is a local minimizer of f (x0, ·) (i.e., g(x0) = y0);
• C3. The Hessian of f (x0, ·),H(x0, ·)=∇2y f (x0,y0) is non-
degenerate at y0 (i.e., det(H(x0,y0))> 0).
Then for every g0 ∈Ny, the gradient of G(x) = 12‖g(x)−g0‖22
at x = x0 is given by
−∇xy f (x0,y0)(∇2y f (x0,y0))−1(g(x0)−g0). (17)
Proof. Let Q be the partial derivative of f with respect to y:
Q(x,y), ∇y f (x,y). Then Eqn (17) is equivalent to
−∇xQ(x0,y0)(∇yQ(x0,y0))−1(g(x0)−g0) (18)
Since g(x0) = y0 (by C2), Q(x0,y0) = 0. Based on C3,
for J , ∇yQ(x0,y0), det(J) 6= 0. According to the implicit
function theorem, there exists a neighborhood of x0, Nˆx ⊂
Nx ⊂Rm, a neighborhood of y0, Nˆy ⊂Ny ⊂Rn, and a unique
smooth function h(x) : Nˆx→ Nˆy such that
Q(x,h(x)) = 0 ∀x ∈ Nˆx (19)
According to C1, for each x ∈ Nˆx, f (x, ·) has a unique local
minimizer g(x) near y0. Then the local minimizer must be h(x)
due to the first-order optimality condition. Thus h(x) = g(x)
for all x ∈ Nˆx. Computing the gradient with respect to x for
Eqn (19), we have
∇xg(x0) =−∇xQ(x0,y0)(∇yQ(x0,y0))−1 (20)
which leads to Eqn (18) by the product rule of gradient.
Back to our case, let `map(m;x) be the objective function
defined in Eqn (9) (or Eqn (16)) and mt be the target map.
Although, strictly speaking, `map(m;x) is not continuously
differentiable, we assume f (x,m) = `map(m;x) satisfies the
conditions of Proposition 2 for analysis purpose.
Note that m∗(x) = argminm `map(m;x) is the optimal map
found by MASK for given x. At a given iteration, let m∗ be
the optimal map of the current input x. We can take a step
towards the direction of
∆=−∇xm`map(m∗;x)(∇2m`map(m∗;x))−1(m∗−mt)
to make the map generated in the next iteration approach
mt . In practice we only have m˜, an estimate of m∗. Let H =
∇2m`map(m˜;x) be the Hessian matrix for fixed x. By plugging
m˜ into ∆ and setting a proper step size α> 0, we have
α∆≈−α∇xm`map(m˜;x)(∇2m`map(m˜;x))−1(m˜−mt)
=−α∇xm`map(m˜;x)H−1(m˜−mt)
=∇x (m˜−αH−1∇m`map(m˜;x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
inner update step
(m˜−mt)
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In our attack, we instantiate the inner update step with an
Adam step to get fast convergence and to avoid the issue of
vanishing Hessian for DNNs with ReLU activation.
A4: Details of StAdv-based ADV2
We first briefly introduce the concept of spatial transforma-
tion. Let x˜i be the i-th pixel of adversarial input x˜ and (u˜i, v˜i)
be its spatial coordinates. With flow-based transformation, x˜
is generated from another input x by a per-pixel flow vector r,
where ri = (∆ui,∆vi). The corresponding coordinates of x˜i in
x are given by (ui,vi) = (u˜i+∆ui, v˜i+∆vi). As (ui,vi) do not
necessarily lie on the integer grid, bilinear interpolation [25]
is used to compute x˜i:
x˜i =∑
j
x j max(0,1−|u˜i+∆ui−u j|)max(0,1−|v˜i+∆vi−v j|)
where j iterates over the pixels adjacent to (ui,vi) in x. With
STADV as the underlying attack framework, ADV2 can be
constructed as optimizing the following objective:
min
r
`prd( f (x+ r),ct)+λ`int(g(x+ r; f ),mt)+ τ`flow(r) (21)
where `flow(r) = ∑i∑ j∈N (i)
√
‖∆ui−∆u j‖22+‖∆vi−∆v j‖22
measures the magnitude of spatial transformation and τ is a
hyper-parameter controlling its importance. In implementa-
tion, we solve Eqn (21) using an Adam optimizer.
A5: Details of AID
We use RTS as a concrete example to show the implemen-
tation of AID. In RTS, one trains a DNN g (parameterized by
θ) to directly predict the attribution map g(x;θ) for a given
input x. To train g, one minimizes the interpretation loss:
`int(θ),λ1rtv(g(x;θ))+λ2rav(g(x;θ))− log( fc (φ(x;g(x;θ))))
+λ3 fc (φ(x;1−g(x;θ)))λ4 (22)
with all the terms defined similarly as in Eqn (8).
In AID, let A denote the ADV2 attack. We further consider
an adversarial distillation loss:
`aid(θ),−‖g(x;θ)−g(A(x);θ)‖1 (23)
which measures the difference of attribution maps of benign
and adversarial inputs under the current interpreter g(·;θ).
AID trains g by alternating between minimizing `int(θ) and
minimizing `aid(θ) until convergence.
B. Parameter Setting
Here we summarize the default parameter setting for the
attacks implemented in this paper.
B1. PGD-based ADV2
For regular PGD, we set the learning rate α= 1./255 and
the perturbation threshold ε= 0.031. Table 11 list the param-
eter setting of PGD-based ADV2.
Parameter ResNet DenseNet
GRAD # iterations ntotal 800 800
`int coefficient (λ) 0.007 0.007
CAM # iterations ntotal 1200 1200
`int coefficient (λ) 0.204/0.02 0.204
MASK
# iterations ntotal 1000 1000
# gradient descent steps nstep 4 4
# iterations per reset nreset 50 50
max. search step size αmax 0.08 0.08
# max. search steps nbs 12 12
RTS
# iterations ntotal 1200 1200
`int coefficient (λ1) 0.002/0.006 0.008
`prd coefficient (λ2) 0.1/- 0.1
Table 11. Parameter setting of PGD-based ADV2. The setting for Q4
in § 4 (if different) is shown after ‘/’.
Parameter ResNet DenseNet
GRAD
# iterations ntotal 800 800
`int coefficient (λ) 0.023 0.023
`flow coefficient (τ) 0.0005 0.0005
CAM
# iterations ntotal 600 600
`int coefficient (λ) 0.653 0.653
`flow coefficient (τ) 0.0005 0.0005
MASK
# iterations ntotal 1000 1000
# gradient descent steps nstep 4 4
# iterations per reset nreset 50 50
`int coefficient (λ) 500 500
`flow coefficient (τ) 0.004 0.005
RTS
# iterations ntotal 600 600
`int coefficient (λ1) 0.0408 0.0612
`prd coefficient (λ2) 0.1 0.1
`flow coefficient (τ) 0.0005 0.0005
Table 12. Parameter setting of STADV-based ADV2.
B2. StAdv-based ADV2
Table 12 list the parameter setting of STADV-based ADV2.
The Adam optimizer in our experiments uses the hyper-
parameter setting of (α,β1,β2) = (0.01,0.9,0.999).
C. Additional Experimental Results
Below we include more experimental results that comple-
ment the ones presented in § 4 and § 5.
C1. § 4 Q2 Attack Effectiveness (Interpretation)
Figure 17 shows a set of sample inputs (benign and adver-
sarial) and their attribution maps generated by GRAD, CAM,
MASK, and RTS on DenseNet.
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Figure 17: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (PGD, ADV2)
inputs with respect to GRAD, CAM, MASK, and RTS on DenseNet.
Table 13 lists the average Lp distance (p = 1,2) between
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the attribution maps of benign and adversarial (PGD, ADV2)
inputs, which complements the results in Figure 5. We nor-
malize the L2 measures by dividing them by the square root
of the number of pixels.
Attack ResNet DenseNet∆ (L1) ∆ (L2) ∆ (L1) ∆ (L2)
GRAD P 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15
A 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07
CAM P 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.36
A 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05
MASK P 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.37
A 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.17
RTS P 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.48
A 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.09
Table 13. Lp distance between attribution maps of benign and adver-
sarial (P-PGD, A-ADV2) inputs.
C2. § 4 Q4 Real Application
In § 4, we use the dataset from the ISIC 2018 challenge2,
and adopt a competition-winning model [18] (with ResNet as
its backbone), which achieves the second place in the chal-
lenge. The confusion matrix in Figure 18 shows the perfor-
mance of the classifier in our study.
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Figure 18: Confusion matrix of the classifier used in § 4 Q4 on the
ISIC 2018 challenge dataset [18].
Table 14 lists the average Lp distance (p = 1,2) between
the attribution maps of benign and adversarial (PGD, ADV2)
inputs in the case study of skin cancer diagnosis.
Attack ∆ (L1) ∆ (L2)
GRAD P 0.19 0.23
A 0.06 0.09
CAM P 0.25 0.31
A 0.06 0.08
MASK P 0.23 0.30
A 0.08 0.11
RTS P 0.15 0.26
A 0.02 0.07
Table 14. Lp distance of attribution maps of benign and adversarial
(PGD, ADV2) inputs in the case study of skin cancer diagnosis.
C3. § 4 Q5 Alternative Attack Framework
Figure 19 visualizes attribution maps of benign and adver-
sarial (STADV, STADV-based ADV2) inputs on DenseNet.
2https://challenge2018.isic-archive.com/task3/
Figure 20 further compares the L1 measures and IoU scores
(w.r.t. benign cases) of adversarial inputs on DenseNet.
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Figure 19: Attribution maps of benign and adversarial (STADV and
STADV-based ADV2) inputs on DenseNet.
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Figure 20: L1 measures and IoU scores of adversarial (STADV,
STADV-based ADV2) inputs w.r.t. benign maps on DenseNet.
C4. § 5 Q1 Random Class Interpretation
Figure 21 visualizes attribution maps of target and adver-
sarial (ADV2) inputs on DenseNet, which complements the
results shown in Figure 12. Figure 22 compares the L1 mea-
sures and IoU scores of adversarial maps w.r.t. benign and
target cases on DenseNet.
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Figure 21: Target and adversarial (ADV2) inputs and their attribution
maps on DenseNet.
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Figure 22: L1 measures (a) and IoU scores (b) of adversarial maps
with respect to benign and target cases on DenseNet.
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